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Common sense can explain the deterrence doctrine: most indi-
viduals prefer to avoid prison and thus are discouraged from engag-
ing in criminal behavior, especially that behavior likely to be
detected and punished. Even citizens alarmed by the amount of
crime committed in the United States must acknowledge that the
threat of punishment deters most individuals, most of the time.
The practical problem facing contemporary deterrence re-
searchers, law makers and other social policy makers is to develop
the correct "formula" for using the threat of punishment to deter
those individuals who are relatively resistant to legal threats, i.e.,
those individuals who commit common or predatory crime. One
commentator has aptly phrased this problem by stating: "The cru-
cial question is not simply whether negative sanctions deter, but
rather under what conditions are negative sanctions likely to be
effective."'
Commentators, with some exceptions, 2 criticize the deterrence
research literature as being largely "atheoretical and divorced from
a body of ideas that predicts the conditions under which legal
* This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice, Grant #81-IJ-
CX-0046. We acknowledge the contributions made to this study by Anthony R. Harris,
Marianne Geronimo Jaffee, and Eleanor Weber-Burdin. Members of the Sorrento
Seminar andJohnJ. Sloan, III made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Purdue Univer-
sity. Ph.D., University of Massachusetts, 1984; M.A., College of William and Mary,
1980; B.A., Keene State College, 1978.
*** Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Massachusetts. Ph.D., Tulane
University, 1967; B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1963.
I Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16 Soc. PROBS. 409, 411 (1969).
2 Notable exceptions include the following: C.R. TrrrLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL
DEvIANCE (1980); Minor, A Deterrence-Control Theory of Crime, in THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY
117-38 (R. Meier ed. 1977).
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threats inhibit criminality." 3 Most recently, theoretical attempts to
re-conceptualize the deterrence principle have focused on sub-
suming the principle within more general social control perspec-
tives.4 Such attempts lead to the inevitable conclusion that
extralegal factors are just as important as legal threats to control
criminal or deviant behavior. Of course, these insights have little
value for law and policy makers who can only use legal threats as a
mechanism of crime control. What is still clearly needed from the
social science community is an adequate explanation for how legal
threats can be used effectively to control crime.
The intent of this paper is to bring general deterrence research 5
closer to theory regarding how the threat of punishment regulates
perceptions of crime opportunities. Specifically, this paper's central
purpose is to cast deterrence research findings in theoretical terms, 6
making them relevant for developing laws and social programs that
can be effective in reducing the incidence and prevalence of preda-
tory crime. 7
II. THE DETERRENCE RESEARCH LITERATURE
A. OVERVIEW
Essentially, the deterrence doctrine is premised on the notion
that criminal sanctions are the "penalty" or "cost" a convicted of-
fender pays for crime.8 Variations in perspectives and in measure-
ment techniques notwithstanding, all deterrence research and
theory is based on implicit or explicit assumptions about normative
systems that value rewards and disvalue punishments. 9 Deterrence
research and theory also makes assumptions about the ability and
3 Short & Meier, Criminology and the Study of Deviance, in THE STATE OF SOCIOLOGY 182
(J. Short ed. 1981).
4 See Williams, Deterrence and Social Control. Rethinking the Relationship, 13 J. CRIM.
JUST. 141, 148 (1985).
5 Conventionally, general deterrence refers to using legal threats to discourage
crime by members of the general population, whereas specific deterrence refers to using
legal sanctions to reduce the likelihood of recidivistic behavior.
6 Chen & Rossi, Evaluating with Sense: The Theory Driven Approach, 7 EVALUATION REV.
283, 285 (1983).
7 SeeJ.Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (rev. ed. 1985). Wilson, an observer of
crime and other urban problems, argues that policy analysis should guide the develop-
ment of crime control programs. Id. at 48-56. He argues that the more valid theories of
crime causation yield no policy relevant variables. Id. at 207-09. The position taken
here is akin to Wilson's, in that we argue policies must be theory driven, for policies to
work in controlling socially intolerable behaviors.
8 As discussed in the following section of this paper, this premise is a serious flaw in
present deterrence theories. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
9 See J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7, at 252-53.
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motivation of the social actor to calculate the costs and benefits of
crime. 10 Furthermore, criminal sanctions, which are established by
legislatures, must be communicated by the media and imposed by
the courts. Thus, the deterrence doctrine is further based on the
assumption that individuals are actually aware of criminal sanc-
tions."l Finally, the deterrence doctrine assumes that the social ac-
tor is discouraged from committing crime when the perceived threat
of punishment, or the cost of crime, exceeds any benefit associated
with the commission of an illegal act. 12
The United States witnessed an unprecendented wave of sen-
tencing reform legislation in the 1970s, arguably due to the demise
of the rehabilitative justification for prison sentences, a perceived
increase in predatory crime and a growing awareness of disparity in
criminal sanctions. 13 As a result of this sentencing reform move-
ment, many states legislated the deterrence doctrine into practice
based on the central premise that stiff punishments can help reduce
the extent of common or predatory crime. 14 Considerable contro-
versy, however, surrounds the effectiveness of deterrence oriented
sentencing laws. Some evaluation researchers contend that the jus-
tification for deterrence based punishments should not be based ex-
clusively on existing empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness
of the deterrence doctrine. 15 Supporters of the deterrence doctrine,
however, contend that the jury is still out: only when the main ele-
ments of the deterrence calculus can be conceptualized and appro-
priately measured can society assess the utility of using punishment
and threats of punishment to effect the crime problem.' 6
In search of empirically sound methods for crime control, some
of the nation's leading social scientists have investigated the effec-
tiveness of deterrence oriented punishments. A comprehensive re-
view of the relevant research literature 17 indicates that researchers
10 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CON-
TROL 224-31 (1973).
11 See id. at 141-49, 296.
12 See id. at 245-48.
13 SeeJ. HAGAN, CRIME, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, AND ITS CONTROL 306-15 (1985).
14 See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & K. DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 273-308 (1983).
15 See J. GIBBS, NORMS, DEVIANCE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CONCEPTUAL MATTERS
(1981); H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER 109 (1982); Heumann & Loftin,
Mandatory Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bargaining: the Michigan Felony Firearm Statute,
13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 393 (1979); Loftin & McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the Florida
Felony Firearms Law, 7 5 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250 (1984).
16 See, e.g., J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7, at 117-44.
17 Deterrence research has been conducted by academicians within the disciplines of
political science, sociology, and psychology. See DiChiara & Galliher, Thirty Years of De-
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have raised three main questions concerning the deterrence doc-
trine. First, what is the salience of punishment certainty, severity,
and celerity? Second, what is the appropriate unit of analysis for
deterrence research? Third, what is the role of financial gain in the
deterrence calculus? The theoretical as well as epistemological in-
sights that result from the debates surrounding these questions are
crucial for developing deterrence based and theory driven crime
control programs.
B. THE MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF PUNISHMENT
The first question concerning the effectiveness of punishment
as a deterrent has centered on determining the importance of pun-
ishment severity, certainty and celerity in the deterrence calculus.
Research measuring the certainty of punishment as a deterrent ef-
fect, as well as research measuring the strength of the various
dimensions of punishment on criminal decisions,18 suggest that
punishment certainty has the greater influence on behavior.' 9
Zimring and Hawkins, writing one of the most fully articulated
theoretical statements on deterrence, explain these findings regard-
ing the importance of punishment certainty. 20 They recognize that
deterrence is a future oriented principle. 21 Social actors, possessing
a consciousness that reaches into the future, operate in the present
time and are somewhat influenced by prior experiences. 22 Although
the future oriented social actor can imagine the effects of punish-
ment (unless the actor has experienced prison), it is his (her) per-
ception of the odds of getting convicted and punished for a crime
that will have the greatest influence in determining his (her) deci-
sion whether or not to commit a crime.23 Empirically, the proposi-
tion that punishment certainty is the most crucial dimension for
terrence Research, 8 CONTEMP. CRISES 243 (1984), for a discussion of the contributions
from the distinct disciplines.
18 See Anderson, Harris & Miller, Models of Deterrence Theory, 12 Soc. Sc. RES. 236,
248 (1983); Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 515 (1968); Hol-
linger & Clark, Deterrence in the Workplace: Perceived Certainty, Perceived Severity, and Emplokyee
Theft, 62 Soc. FORCES 398, 402-03 (1983); Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and Crime
Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974).
19 See Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM.
Soc. REv. 261, 269-70 (1984); Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in
England and Wales 1894-1967, 86J. POL. ECON. 815, 819-20 (1978).
20 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 158-73.
21 Id. at 77-83.
22 Id. at 84-87.
23 Id. See Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effect of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49
Am. Soc. REv. 261 (1984).
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discouraging crime has been observed, 24 and, theoretically, this
proposition can be explained.
C. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
The second question found throughout the deterrence litera-
ture is a methodological or an epistemological one regarding the
appropriate unit of analysis for deterrence research. Some investi-
gators have used crime rates as dependent variables, generally
within a comparative framework, to examine the effectiveness of cer-
tain laws within certain jurisdictions. 25 Essentially, these research-
ers posit that aggregated arrest or conviction data summarize a
generalized effect of punishmnent on criminal behavior across
individuals .26
Conversely, other investigators view the individual social actor
as the only appropriate unit of analysis. 27 Theoretical work on deci-
sion making and information integration 28 makes the individual unit
of analysis position espoused by some deterrence researchers the
more reasonable one. This work shows that individual social actors,
when making decisions, estimate and integrate subjectively per-
ceived rewards and punishments associated with possible behav-
iors. 29 According to this approach, each individual must calculate
the risk of apprehension and punishment when encountering a
crime opportunity. This calculation requires an individual level de-
cision making process that cannot be reflected by aggregated data.
D. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL GAIN IN DETERRENCE
The third question, cogently summarized by James Q. Wilson, 30
concerns the role of perceived gain in the criminal decision. Many
24 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 10, at 84-87.
25 See, e.g., Chilton, Analyzing Urban Crime Data: Deterrence and the Limitations of Arrests
Per Offense Ratios, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 590, 605 (1982); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 397, 398-417 (1975); Waldo &
Chiricos, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self Reported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to Deter-
rence Research, 19 Soc. PROBS. 522 (1972).
26 See Chilton, supra note 25.
27 See C.R. TITTLE, supra note 2, at 225; Erickson, Gibbs &Jensen, The Deterrence Doc-
trine and the Perceived Certainty of Legal Punishments, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 305, 306 (1979);
Montmarquette & Nerlove, Deterrence and Delinquency: An Analysis of Individual Data, 1 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 37, 39 (1985).
28 See L. OFSHE & R. OFSHE, UTILITY AND CHOICE IN SOCIAL INTERACTION 89 (1970);
Anderson, Information and Integration Theory: A Brief Survey, in MEASUREMENT, PSYCHO-
PHYSICS, AND NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING (D. Kranis ed. 1974); Tversky, Additivity,
Utility, and Subjective Probability, 4J. OF MATHEMATICAL PSYCHOLOGY 175 (1967).
29 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
30 See J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7. See also J.Q. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE 44 (1985).
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deterrence researchers ignore individual perceptions of financial re-
ward because gain (or reward) is considered to be external to the
legal and normative system that metes out punishment.3 ' Neverthe-
less, the possibility of reward certainly influences criminal conduct.
How do the individual's perceptions of gain-financial gain from il-
legal as well as from legal activities-influence perceptions regard-
ing punishment certainty and punishment severity in the decision to
avoid or approach crime opportunities? Logically, if punishment
discourages crime, the potential for illicit economic gain encourages
crime. Moreover, if the gain from crime mitigates the threat of pun-
ishment, legal opportunities for financial gain can discount the value
of the financial reward from crime.3 2 In developing theoretically
based deterrence laws and policies, the role of perceived legal and
illegal economic rewards cannot be ignored.
III. CONCEPTUAL FLAWS
A. OVERVIEW
To refine the existing deterrence doctrine, integration of the
empirical and theoretical contributions from the earlier works dis-
cussed above is necessary. It is also necessary to rid the doctrine of
two crucial flaws: 1) the conceptual failure to distinguish between
normative consensus and the influence of crime and punishment
norms on behavior, perceptions and decision making; and 2) the
mistaken view that criminal sanctions, especially the prison sen-
tence, are the only calculable and potential penalties or costs associ-
ated with crime.
B. NORMATIVE SYSTEMS
Weber argued that the rules governing social behavior tell ac-
tors what "is" empirically and what "ought to be" vis-a-vis their nor-
mative dimension.33 Consider, for example, the rule "do not steal."
This rule empirically reflects the notion that stealing can result in
punishment. The rule also indicates that one ought to avoid steal-
ing, a socially disvalued behavior.
31 See I. PILIAVIN & R. GARTNER, THE IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-OFFEND-
ERS-2 THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION 88-92 (1981).
32 As Wilson argues, select social programs, such as the Supported Work Program,
improve opportunities for legitimately earned income and thus must be viewed as deter-
rence oriented programs.J.Q. WILSON, supra note 7. See I. PILIAVIN & R. GARTNER, THE
IMPACT OF SUPPORTED WORK ON Ex-OFFENDERS-VOLUME 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION (1981).
33 Weber, R. Stammler's Surmounting of the Materialist Conception of History, 3 BRIT.J.L. &
Soc'y 17 (M. Albrow trans. 1976).
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Normative systems contain explicit and implicit rules for behav-
ior as well as criteria for distinguishing the rewards from the punish-
ments associated with social life. Laws emanate from codified
normative rules that exist within a specific institution of coercion
(the courts) and are thus analytically distinct from rules of conven-
tion. Other norms dominate the behavior and perceptions of social
actors due to normative consensus, i.e., widespread agreement
within a community over the legitimacy of those norms. Normative
consensus, Weber argued, results from a plurality of social factors
habitually and subjectively experiencing actions guided by rules. 34
If one considers normative consensus to be a form of legitimate
domination, then the empirical distribution of known predatory
criminals implies that segments of the general population are differ-
entially likely to subscribe to or dissent from popular norms.35 Sev-
eral factors, including variation in the knowledge of norms,
perceptions of fairness, and socioeconomic status, are arguably par-
tial explanations for dissensus over normative systems that provide
the rules and guidelines for appraising criminal and noncriminal
opportunities.3 6
The deterrence doctrine is flawed by its failure to account for
the distinction between the extent of normative consensus and dif-
ferences in the degree to which social beings act according to the
dictates of existing norms. As a result, one can conclude that deter-
rence oriented laws accept as nonproblematic normative consensus,
especially with respect to disvaluing criminal sanctions.
Are select segments of the general population less likely to sub-
scribe to a normative system that makes crime highly disvalued be-
havior? Or, generally, does consensus chartacterize the views held
by the population regarding crime and its punishments? Surely, no
deterrence based law can be effective unless it is directed toward the
appropriate normative system or systems that make the criminal
sanction a threat worth avoiding.
B. THE PENAL SANCTION
The second major flaw associated with contemporary variants
of the deterrence doctrine is the conceptualization of the penal
34 M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954).
35 Several sources of data clearly show that young, poor, minority men are dispro-
portionately arrested for predatory crime. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1985, at 416-22 (1986).
36 Hagan & Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in America, 88
AM. J. Soc. 329, 333-39 (1982); Hamilton & Rytina, Social Consensus in Norms of Justice:
Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 85 AM. J. Soc. 1117, 1122-24 (1980).
[Vol. 77
1986] UPDATING THE DETERRENCE DOCTRINE
sanction as the exclusive "cost" or "penalty" associated with crime.
In a capitalist economy, the financial cost to the offender of a term
in prison or jail can be estimated easily, and the resulting measure
of foregone personal income can be used to convince potential law
breakers that "crime does not pay." The rational actor who bal-
ances the perceived probable cost of crime against the probable
gain should be twice as deterred by the threat of a two year prison
sentence than by the threat of a one year sentence.3 7 Thus, accord-
ing to this economic conceptualization, the courts should impose
stiffer penalties to deter more crime. Our contention, however, is
that the prison term cannot be measured only in terms of financial
costs; instead it must be measured as a multi-dimensional and ex-
treme form of punishment.
In a bygone era, the sack of ashes (albeit perhaps an apocryphal
sack) symbolized the community's denunciation of sins and sinners.
Contemporarily, penal sanctions given by trial courts symbolize the
distinction between the serious criminal offense and all other forms
of illicit or deviant behavior in the United States. The states' penal
codes specify which are the serious criminal offenses deserving a
term of incarceration and which are the relatively trivial offenses de-
serving a monetary fine.38 Thus, punishments are not limited to the
"penalties" paid or the "costs" incurred by criminal offenders.
Convicted felony offenders, as well as serious misdemeanor offend-
ers, are sentenced to "serve" punishments-typically a term of pro-
bation or incarceration in prison. Since punishments can be served
as well as paid, perceptions of punishment severity cannot be mea-
sured in terms of affordability. Punishment severity must be con-
ceptualized in terms of deprivations. The offender punished by the
court with a term of incarceration is deprived of liberty, autonomy
and certain civil rights.39
Accurate conceptions of punishment severity perceptions must
also incorporate views of the symbolic and stigmatizing function of
the penal sanction. Symbolically, the second phase of a bifurcated
37 This illustration can be modified by introducing the notion of marginal disutility to
the dimension of punishment severity, suggesting that a two year term of incarceration
might be perceived as less than twice as severe as a one year term. Regardless, the
relevant issue here is that the penal sanction is not amenable to quantification with an
economic metric.
38 In the state of Indiana, for example, an offender convicted of a CLASS C misde-
meanor "may be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than sixty (60) days; in addi-
tion, he may be fined not more than five hundred dollars ($500)." IND. CODE § 35-50-3-
4 (West 1986). The offender convicted of CLASS A felony "shall be imprisoned for a
fixed term of thirty (30) years." IND. CODE § 35-50-2-4 (West 1986).
39 SeeJ. INCIARDI, CRIMINALJUSTICE 662 (1984).
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criminal trial-the sentencing hearing-is an institutionalized deg-
radation ceremony where the impartial judge, in the name of public
values, denounces the offender by either removing the offender
from the community, or restricting his (her) freedom according to
the probation contract.40
The conceptual flaw of treating the penal sanction as only the
"cost" of crime has severe implications for the deterrence doctrine.
If perceptions of punishment severity extend the boundaries of fi-
nancial estimations, criminal law that protracts the prison term for
the purpose of deterrence cannot be effective, nor can it be a cost
efficient method for controlling the crime problem.
IV. A STUDY OF ECONOMICALLY MOTIVATED CRIME OPPORTUNITIES
A. OVERVIEW
The data for this research is the product of our study funded by
the National Institute ofJustice to develop appropriate measures for
observing perceptions of individuals encountering hypothetical
crime opportunities. 4 1 The study is designed to reflect the three
major contributions to the deterrence research tradition discussed
above. First, it measures the importance of punishment certainty
and punishment severity in perceptions of crime opportunities. Sec-
ond, the individual's judgment is the unit of measurement. Third,
the study measures both the perceived disutility of the criminal
sanction as well as the perceived utility of financial gain from
crime.42
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS
Unlike most deterrence research, in this study respondents are
members of the general public rather than convicted or incarcerated
offenders. The purpose of the study is to explicate the deterrence
calculus. Thus, this study models the perceived probability of com-
mitting economically motivated crimes for those individuals who are
apparently responsive to legal threats. As such, it permits an inves-
tigation of differences in the extent to which individuals subscribe to
the normative system that determines the value of criminal gain and
the disvalue of criminal sanctions.
A purposive sample of survey respondents is created to reflect
40 Garfinkel, Conditions of a Successful Degradation Ceremony, 61 AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956).
41 For additional information on the study see Anderson, Harris & Miller, supra note
18.
42 This study is informed by the subjective expected utility perspective of decision
making. See L. OFSHE & R. OFSHE, supra note 28, at 11-20.
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roughly the empirical relationships between predatory crime arrest
data and the offender personal background characteristics of age,
gender, family income and race.43 A total of 751 individuals in the
crime prone age groups (age fifteen to thirty-six) participated in a
factorial survey study conducted in 1982 in Baltimore. Proportion-
ate to their representation in the general population, women are un-
dersampled and blacks are oversampled. In total, 347 white men,
173 white women, 154 black men and 77 black women are surveyed.
Twenty percent of the sample falls close to the Social Security Ad-
ministration's definition of poor households in the United States.44
Respondents were given booklets containing fifty vignettes.
Each vignette describes a potential crime opportunity in terms of
the nature of the offense, the possible economic gain from the
crime, the risk of being caught and convicted of the crime and the
punishment. We express the punishment that would result from
conviction in terms of prison time and fines. 45 Figure 1 is an exam-
ple of the crime opportunity vignettes used in the study. Respon-
dents indicate on the rating line following each vignette how likely
someone like themselves would be to commit the hypothetical crime
under the circumstances described in the vignette. Therefore, the
dependent measure is the perceived probability of a criminal
decision.
The factorial survey design that we use combines the benefits of
a controlled experiment with those associated with survey research.
Factorial objects, i.e., the individual vignettes, are constructed to
model experimental conditions, and an adequate sample of the pop-
ulation being studied is selected to respond to the vignette book-
lets.46 In this study, a total of 37,750 crime opportunity vignettes
are rated (751 respondents X 50 factorial objects each).
To construct vignettes, a computer program randomly assigns
values for all of the dimensions of information appearing in the vi-
gnettes. Thus, factorial objects are analogous to iterations under
43 These data can be found in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 416-22.
44 The 1981 Social Security Administration poverty index was used to define poverty
thresholds for the 200 interviews of individuals whose household income put them at or
below a point equal to 150% of the "poverty line." The poverty index takes into ac-
count household size. Thus, a one person household is within 150% of the poverty level
at $7,065 and a five person household is within 150% of the poverty level at $16,425
gross annual 1981 income.
45 The research discussed here was also concerned with three non-economic crimes:
carrying a handgun illegally, smoking marijuana, and assault. Those three crimes are
not discussed in this paper.
46 See MEASURING SOCIALJUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY APPROACH (P. Rossi &
S. Nock eds. 1982).
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FIGURE 1
EXAMPLE OF CRIME OPPORTUNITY VIGNETTE
THE CRIME YOU HAVE AN
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT IS: LYING ON INCOME TAX REPORT
IF YOU GET AWAY WITH IT THE
GAIN WILL BE: $5,000 GAIN
THE CHANCE OF GETTING CAUGHT
AND CONVICTED IS: 40% CHANCE OF BEING CAUGHT
AND CONVICTED
THE PENALTY IF CAUGHT AND
CONVICTED IS: 6 MONTHS IN JAIL
AND
$500 FINE
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT YOU WOULD
COMMIT THE CRIME?
0% "10%'20%'30%'40% 50% 60%o 70% 80% 90% 100%
ABSOLUTELY ABSOLUTELY
WOULD NOT WOULD
COMMIT CRIME COMMIT CRIME
experimental conditions. For this research, five dimensions of in-
formation are rotated: 1) Type of Crime, 2) Risk, 3) Prison, 4) Fine
and 5) Gain. Note that Risk is a measure of punishment certainty,
whereas Prison and Fine are measures of punishment severity. Ta-
ble 1 shows the levels for the five dimensions of the hypothetical
crime opportunity vignettes.
By design, factorial surveys generate asymptotically orthogonal
variables, making them ideal for using an Ordinary Least Squares
(O.L.S.) analytical approach 47 to observe how various dimensions of
information are weighted and integrated by respondents when
forming judgments abvout social objects. 48 The initial data file ana-
lyzed in this research contains 37,750 cases of information. Each
case contains coded values for the five vignette dimensions under
investigation, the respondent's perceived probability of a criminal
decision and the respondent's background characteristics, which are
obtained from an interview following the vignette rating task.
C. THE DETERRENCE CALCULUS
As discussed above, one primary purpose of the crime opportu-
47 E. HANUSHEK & J. JACKSON, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 45-65
(1977); D. KLEINBAUM & L. KUPPER, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND OTHER MUL-
TIVARIATE METHODS 131-57 (1978).
48 For a general description of using factorial objects, see Rossi & Anderson, The
Factorial Survey Approach, in MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY AP-
PROACII, supra note 46, at 1.
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TABLE 1
VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS AND LEVELS
TYPE OF CRIME* RISK PRISON FINE GAIN
Armed Robbery 0 0 0 5
Purse Snatching 5 Probation** 100 25
Tax Evasion 10 .5 200 50
Stealing from Store 20 1 400 100
Selling Heroin 30 2 600 250
Selling Marijuana 40 4 800 500
Embezzlement 50 6 1,000 750
60 8 2,000 1,000
70 10 4,000 2,000
80 15 6,000 4,000
90 20 8,000 6,000








* Three non-economic crimes were also used, but they are not discussed in this paper.
** For the data examined here, probation was arbitrarily coded as .25 years.
nity study is to reflect the knowledge gained from earlier deterrence
research in an attempt to model the deterrence calculus that charac-
terizes individuals of the general public. Considering the distribu-
tion of known criminal incidents in the United States, a single
equation linear additive model, modified to include a block of
dummy variables to represent the Crime Type dimension, was used
initially in the analysis designed to explain variance in the vignette
ratings made by white males, white females, black males and black
females. 49 Subsequent analysis using a logarithmic model produces
a significant improvement over the linear model in R 2 values for the
four gender by race subsamples. The error term (1-R2 ), however,
remained large for all subsamples, with the specified model being
the most successful in explaining variance in white male vignette
ratings.




The findings, partly summarized in Table 2, represent at the
subsample unit of analysis the perceived probability of criminal de-
TABLE 2
LINEAR MODEL REGRESSIONS SUBSAMPLE UNIT OF ANALYSIS
VIGNETTE















































































































* p less than .05
** p less than .01
The Gain and Fine coefficients have been multiplied by 1,000 and reflect the
expected change in the vignette rating given a $1,000 increase in Gain or Fine net of
other variables.
Armed Robbery is the omitted category in a block of dummy variables to represent
crime type.
cisions as a function of crime type,50 economic gain, risk, fine,
prison term and random error. Based on the subsample unit of
analysis, it is clear that perceived criminal choices or decisions can
50 Seven different crime descriptions were rotated in vignettes in order to give re-
spondents different crime scenarios tojudge. The net effects of the various crime stems
are not discussed in this paper.
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be modeled. The partial regression coefficients representing the
net effects of the vignette dimensions are statistically significant and
in the predicted directions. As the gain from the hypothetical crime
opportunity increases, the perceived probability of committing a
crime increases. Likewise, as the certainity and severity of punish-
ment increases, the perceived probability of illegal behavior
decreases.
Based on the subsample unit of analysis, one could infer that
white men, compared to the other gender by race segments of the
population, are more likely to balance the cost of crime against the
potential gain from crime when making decisions to approach or
avoid criminal opportunities. Such an inference would permit the
conclusion that the threat of severe sanctions best deters white men.
The analysis described above also suggests that aggregating the
vignette ratings to the subsample unit of analysis can mask the struc-
ture of the individual's decision calculus. This approach could re-
sult in a misrepresentation of the degree to which the perceived
probability of committing crimes is influenced by a consideration of
the benefits and costs associated with criminal behavior for white
males, white females, black males and black females. In other
words, it is possible that the "within group" differences in the deci-
sion making calculus vary across the four gender by race segments
of the general population. If "within group" differences vary con-
siderably, the relatively high R2 value for white males at the subsam-
ple unit of analysis would imply only that the individual white male
is less likely than the individual black male, the individual black fe-
male or the individual white female to deviate from the values and
norms governing white male perceptions.
One major purpose of this study is to examine individuals' dif-
ferential subscription to normative systems that can influence the
criminal decision. Thus, it is necessary to examine the individual
respondent's calculus for balancing the perceived disvalue of pun-
ishment against the perceived value of gain.
D. THE INDIVIDUAL UNIT OF ANALYSIS
A crucial benefit of the factorial survey design is that it places
no restrictions on the unit of aggregation for analysis. All vignette
ratings can be pooled and analyzed together; subsamples of ratings
can be analyzed separately (as discussed above); or the individual's
vignette ratings can be analyzed. For this particular research, the
individual respondent's decision making calculus is modeled in or-
der to obtain the best representation of how the gender by race seg-
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ments of the general population tend to value and disvalue the
benefits and costs of crime when faced with criminal opportunities.
To explain variance in criminal opportunity judgments at the
respondent unit of analysis, one functional form of an equation is
specified for 751 separate O.L.S. analyses of vignette ratings. The
final estimated function is of the form:
Y = 3o + 31 loge G + 321og, P + 133R + J34F + M3Di + e,
where f30 is the constant and I3k is the partial regression coefficient of
the kth vignette variable. The meanings of the other terms are given
below:
loge G = Natural Logarithm of Gain in Dollars
loge P = Natural Logarithm of Prison Time in Years
R = Risk on a 0 - 100 Scale
F - Fine in Dollars
D = 0 - 1 Crime Dummies with Tax Evasion Omitted
E = Stochastic Error Term with Usual O.L.S. Assumptions
Y = Perceived Probability of Crime on a 0 - 100 Scale.
We used the single equation model to generate the respondent unit
of analysis data. Each case in this particular data file contains the
respondent's partial regression coefficients, the multiple R2 value
from the full equation, the mean vignette rating and the numerical
values that represent such personal background characteristics as
age, gender, race, income and level of education.
E. GENERAL RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
A major conceptual flaw associated with popular variations of
the deterrence doctrine is the implicit acceptance of widespread
consensus over normative systems that make the penal sanction an
especially disvalued punishment. This research, however, takes
consensus as problematic. It examines perceptions about hypotheti-
cal crime opportunities based on the premise that meaningful seg-
ments of the general public may indeed subscribe to distinctive
norms that guide their perceptions.
This study is principally concerned with crime opportunity
norms that characterize the gender and race segments of the gen-
eral population. We choose to focus on these particular segments
because they show extreme and obvious differences in their proxim-
ity to crime and the criminal justice system. 51
51 Major differences in crime opportunity judgments would be predicted among the
age strata, occupational groups, and so forth.
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F. THE PROXIMITY PROBLEM
In terms of gender and race, the empirical picture shows that
males and blacks are more likely than females and whites to be ar-
rested for crimes or victimized by predatory offenses. 52 Additional
indicators such as the composition of the prison populations53 or
offenders shot by police54 reaffirm the notion that males, especially
black males, are disproportionately represented within the criminal
justice populations. The probabilities of predatory crime victimiza-
tion, arrest and incarceration summarize an objective proximity to
crime and the criminal justice process. Quite clearly, the race and
gender segments are not equally proximite to crime and the crimi-
nal justice system at an objective level.
Moreover, there is some evidence for suggesting that the gen-
der and race segments of the general population are not equally
proximate to crime and the criminal justice system at the subjective
level. A concern over crime, a fear of being victimized by violent
crime, and perceptions of fairness in criminal justice can be used to
summarize a subjective proximity to crime and criminal justice.
Some researchers have found that females and blacks fear crime
more than males and whites.55 Others have found that blacks per-
ceive more injustice than whites in the legal response to crime. 56
G. EXPECTED PATTERNS OF RACE AND GENDER DIFFERENCE
Premised on: 1) an expectation of a lack of normative consen-
sus due to variations in objective and subjective proximity to crime
and criminal justice, and 2) the salience of financial gain, punish-
ment severity, and punishment certainity in the deterrence calculus,
the following gender and race patterns are expected when examin-
ing perceptions of crime opportunities at the respondent unit of
analysis.
(1) Compared to males, females are expected to indicate a lower
perceived probability of committing economically motivated crime.
52 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: RE-
PORTING CRIMES TO THE POLICE 4 (1985).
53 Bureau ofjustice Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1985,
at 4 (1986). See Christianson, Our Black Prisons, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
BLACKS 259 (D. Georges-Aveyie ed. 1984).
54 Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707
(1982); Geller & Karales, Shootings of and by Chicago Police: U'ncommnon arises, 72J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1813 (1981).
55 Liska, Lawrence & Sanchirico, Fear of Crime as a Social Fact, 60 Soc. FORCES 760,
762 (1982); Warr & Stafford, Fear of Victimization: .4 Look at the Proximate Canses, 61 Soc.
FORCES 1033, 1040-41 (1983).
56 See supra note 36.
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(2) The average black male deterrence calculus is expected to be
as structured as the average white male calculus, when measured by
respondent level R2 values.
(3) Norms for disvaluing punishment and for valuing gain, as they
are represented by respondent level partial regression coefficients
that model the deterrence calculus, are expected to vary across gen-
der by race segments of the general population.
(4) The Gain, Risk and Prison vignette dimensions are expected to
be weighted more heavily by males than by females.
(5) Regardless of gender and race, Prison and Fine measures of
crime severity are expected to be less important in the deterrence
calculus than Gain or Risk.
V. FINDINGS
A. SUMMARY MEASURES
Table 3 shows the gender by race distributions of two summary
measures derived from the respondent unit of analysis examination
TABLE 3
SUMMARY MEASURES
(A) MEAN RATINGS -Judgment Tendencies
Respondent Group X
White Males (N=346) 29.505 14.523
White Females (N= 172) 28.296 15.854
Black Males (N= 151) 27.659 18.185
Black Females (N=77) 23.094 18.143
(B) EXPLAINED VARIANCES - Degree of Structure in Judgments
Respondent Group X a
White Males (N=346) .580 .172
White Females (N= 172) .561 .153
Black Males (N=151) .555 .187
Black Females (N=77) .588 .165
of vignette ratings. The respondent level mean vignette rating, dis-
played in the top panel of Table 3, is called the rating tendency and
represents the overall perceived probability of committing economi-
cally motivated crimes. Separate variance estimates are used to
identify statistically significant differences across pairs of mean rat-
ing tendencies. As expected, this analysis shows that the mean of
the black female vignette rating tendency is substantially and signifi-
cantly lower than either the mean of the white male or the black
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male rating tendency. These data imply that, on average, black wo-
men perceive a lesser likelihood of committing crime than men.
These data, however, quite unexpectedly suggest that white wo-
men, faced with what are considered the "right circumstances" for
committing crime, perceive that they are as likely as males to take
advantage of a criminal opportunity. In the past decade, Simon 57
and Adler 58 among other criminologists predicted dramatic in-
creases in the number of women in the arrest data. 59 Contrary to
those predictions, no factual data indicate that women today are
committing more serious crimes than they have in the past. 60 This
study, however, suggests that some white women are experiencing
at a subjective level a greater likelihood of committing crime than
we anticipated.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the distribution of respon-
dent level multiple R2 values from the individual respondent level of
analysis. The multiple R2 values represent the degree to which the
single equation used to model the respondents' perceived likelihood
of criminal decisions summarizes the vignette dimension effects. As
expected, but contrary to what a subsample level of analysis implies
(see Table 2), there are no significant differences across the gender
and race segments regarding the degree to which perceived criminal
decisions are structured by the weighting and integrating of dimen-
sions of information appearing in the vignettes.
When examining the standard deviations of the distributions of
respondent R2 values, one must note, however, that the values for
black males and females are more dispersed than those for white
males and females. The standard deviations suggest that to ade-
quately represent black perceptions of crime opportunities, the
black individual's perceptions must be analyzed. A subsample unit of
analysis may only be appropriate for representing limited segments
of the general population, i.e., those more likely to show consensus
in judgments.
B. NORMS GOVERNING PERCEPTIONS OF GAIN AND PUNISHMENT
Table 4 displays the gender by race distributions of the respon-
dent level partial regression coefficients representing the net influ-
ences of Gain, Risk, Prison and Fine on the perceived probability of
criminal decisions. The partial regression coefficients essentially re-
57 R. SIMON, WOMEN AND GRIME 105-10 (1975).
58 F. ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL (1975).
59 Id. at 250; R. SIMON, supra note 57, at 48.
60 C. MANN, FEMALE CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 15-20 (1984); Steffensmier, Sex dzjfer-




MEAN STATISTICS FROM INDIVIDUAL LEVEL REGRESSIONS
VIGNETTE DIMENSION WHITE MALES WHITE FEMALES BLACK MALES BLACK FEMALES
R(o) (a) R (r) R (a)
Log Gain 3.585 3.059 3.062 2.289
(2.516) (2.250) (2.758) (2.895)
Risk -. 398 -. 356 -. 254 -. 192
(.259) (.243) (.311) (.288)
Log Prison -1.802 -1.420 -1.096 -. 890
(1.768) (1.565) (1.734) (1.890)
Fine in -. 046 -. 039 -. 038 -. 032
Hundreds (.099) (.095) (.105) (.103)
(N) 346 172 151 77
flect the respondent's accepted norms for valuing the financial gain
from crime and for disvaluing the punishment associated with a
criminal conviction.
The statistics displayed in Table 4 show that, as expected, mem-
bers of the gender and race segments of the general population
tend to subscribe to at least moderately different normative systems
that guide perceptions of economic crime opportunities. Moreover,
white men and black women appear to show the greatest differences
in subscription to norms for valuing the gain from crime and disval-
uing the various dimensions of punishment for crime. Regardless of
the vignette dimension under consideration, the average white male
partial regression coefficient is substantially larger than the average
black female statistic.
C. STRENGTH OF EFFECTS
This particular application of the factorial survey design per-
mits a comparison across and within the gender by race segments of
the relative strengths of the vignette dimensions in a criminal deci-
sion calculus. When independent variables are orthogonal, as they
are by design in this research, the sum of the squared standardized
partial regression coefficients approximates the coefficient of deter-
mination. Thus, 3i/X13i 2 was used to estimate the strength of the
Risk, Prison, Gain and Fine dimensions. The resulting gender by
race distributions of strength measures are displayed in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF VIGNETTE DIMENSIONS*
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DIMENSION WHITE MALES WHITE FEMALES BLACK MALES BLACK FEMALES
Gain .326 .239 .280 .256
Prison .137 .115 .103 .094
Risk .529 .395 .285 .258
Fine .029 .039 .046 .040
(N) 345 172 151 77
* 3i/X13i2
The only finding congruent with expectations for race and gen-
der differences in the weighting (or strength) of vignette dimensions
concerns the average net effect of financial gain. Men, especially
white men, are more strongly influenced than black men or black
women by the punishment dimensions of certainty and severity
(Risk and Prison) when judging crime scenarios.
Congruent with expectations for similarities in the deterrence
calculus, the four gender by race groups indicate that the certainty
of getting caught and convicted for a crime (Risk) has a stronger
effect than the dimensions of crime severity (Prison and Fine) in the
deterrence calculus. Morever, the financial gain from a hypothetical
crime appears to have a relatively strong influence on the crime op-
portunity judgments made by the typical respondent, regardless of
gender or race.61
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The data analyzed in this research represent judgments about
hypothetical criminal situations or the perceived probabilities of
criminal decisions. How closely such judgments about social sub-
jects correspond to behavior is a matter for speculation and empiri-
cal verification. What these data show and imply, however, with
respect to how survey respondents subjectively value and disvalue
the financial gain and the potential punishments associated with
crime opportunities are important for understanding how legal
61 AsJ. Kim and C. Mueller show, the magnitudes of the standardized partial regres-
sion coefficients are influenced in part by the variance in the independent variables, in
this research, a design effect. Kim & Mueller, Standardized and Unstandardized Coefficients in
Causal Analysis: An Expository Note, 4 Soc. METHODS & RES. 423 (1976). Thus, within
group comparisons of the strength of the different vignette dimensions must be inter-
preted with caution.
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threats can be used effectively to discourage common criminal
behavior.
Clearly this research shows that the threat of punishment is a
central and multi-dimensional factor of information processed by in-
dividuals faced with perceived economically motivated crime oppor-
tunities. Most importantly, these data suggest that predatory crime
control policies ought to focus on the certainty of punishment as the
primary means for discouraging illicit behaviors. Thus, increasing
the likelihood of a criminal conviction and criminal sanction is likely
to be more effective than lengthening prison sentences under a de-
terrence based punishment scheme.
For individuals faced with criminal opportunities, punishment
severity is more than an opportunity cost, i.e., foregone income. A
better understanding of perceptions regarding the deprivations and
stigmas associated with the penal sanction is needed before law
makers and policy makers can attempt to deter crime with punish-
ment severity. This research indicates that, to be effective, preda-
tory crime control programs must neutralize or discount the value
of financial gain from crime. Blocking criminal opportunities as well
as providing legal opportunities for financial gain should be incor-
porated into social programs that are designed to ameliorate the
predatory crime problem.
Deterrence based theory, law, and social policy cannot assume
normative consensus. This research found at least moderate dissen-
sus across the gender by race segments of the general population
over normative guidelines for disvaluing the criminal sanction. Fu-
ture theoretical and empirical work on the deterrence doctrine must
examine variations in perceptions of both the upside and the down-
side of criminal opportunities across meaningful segments of the
general population. Deterrence based laws or programs cannot be
fully effective until we learn why, for some individuals, prison is not
a threat worth avoiding.
